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Abstract
This article examines the role of visualisations in astrophysics programming work, showing that 
visualisations are not only outputs for those producing them, but can help those developing them 
understand how to do their work. Studies of visualization in programming have mainly been of 
social and cultural factors influencing scientific research. We concentrate on the material aspects 
of scientific work, as of interest in their own right and on methodological grounds (since capturing 
the material practices of computer screen-work is an underexplored area). Using a ‘video-aided 
ethnographic’ method we analyse an episode of computational astrophysics involving the use of the 
Python programming language. We identify a selection of activities comprising the screen work of 
an astrophysics researcher to unpack how those activities contribute to the production of scientific 
knowledge.




The spread of computing throughout social life 
has impacted the natural sciences such that the 
use of computers to simulate phenomena or 
automate the gathering and analysis of data has 
become an alternative to physical data collection 
and experiments (for studies of computational 
programming work see Button and Sharrock, 
1994, 1995, 1996; Knuuttila, 2006; Knuuttila et 
al., 2006; Knuuttila and Boon, 2011; Martin and 
Rooksby, 2006; Merz, 2006; Rooksby et al., 2006). 
Using video-recordings of a researcher testing 
out a program to convert electronic input relayed 
from an orbital telescope into a set of images ena-
bling the identification of gravitational lenses, 
we explore an assortment of problems that the 
researcher meets in trying to ensure that his pro-
gram is dependably categorising these galactic 
images.
Our attention to the visual features of compu-
tation reflects a growing interest in how scientists 
engage with visualisations (Amann and Knorr 
Cetina, 1990; Burri and Dumit, 2008; Carusi et al., 
2010; Lynch, 2011; Messeri, 2017). Our work is 
aligned with studies exploring the material work 
2of dealing with digital images and visual data in 
scientific research (Alač, 2011; Carusi, 2008, 2011; 
Coopmans, 2006, 2011; Daipha, 2010; Hoeppe, 
2012, 2014; Sormani, 2014; Spencer, 2012; Vertesi, 
2012).1 We focus on the practices involved in 
visualisation-based and visually-oriented research 
work, and how those practices intertwine with the 
wider scientific knowledge and context of that 
work. Alač notes of this:
The materiality of the scientific data – their digital 
character – allows the practitioners to understand 
what they are working with as something that is 
mathematical, while it, at the same time, moves 
and needs to be rotated, squished and squashed. 
(Alač, 2011: 145)
Images and visualisations are used by the practi-
tioners that generate them as part of their routine 
work, in such a way that “scientific visuals do not 
represent knowledge and problem solving, but 
are a part of such processes” (Alač, 2011: 162). Our 
approach to visual-work is grounded in Coulter 
and Parsons’ (1990: 255) claim that “‘seeing’ is akin 
to an achievement and is not any sort of activity, 
process, or undertaking”. Therefore we attend to 
the various activities that generate and construe 
an adequate ‘seeing’ of an  astronomical phenom-
enon – the ‘searching for’, the ‘inspecting’, the 
‘observing’, etc – on the part of one astrophysics 
researcher, to show more clearly what constitutes 
an achievement of this kind.
We begin by exploring two relevant literary 
bodies around the roles of computing in scien-
tific research work and the underdevelopment of 
social research attending to its material practices, 
outlining a series of methodological concerns 
around capturing and analysing ‘independently-
executed’ computer screen work. After depicting 
the context of the activities that form our topic, 
we analyse our data along six themes capturing 
a variety of material practices involved in the 
visual-work of scientific research. These themes 
are: making code visual; highlighting for visibility; 
finding through searching; finding visual utility 




As computer tools have become increasingly 
prominent in routine scientific work, so they have 
become increasingly pertinent to social studies 
of science, which focus on the constructing and 
constraining functions of interaction in an era of 
computational and digital science. There are two 
related issues in this body of work: firstly, distinc-
tions between ‘science’ and ‘computing’ work, 
and secondly, the neglect of the material work of 
using computers to do science (relative to a focus 
on communal and collaborative elements).
Several studies (e.g. Agar, 2006; Bijker et al, 
2016; Bruun and Sierla, 2008; Götschel, 2011; Hine, 
2006; Larivière et al, 2016; Louvel, 2012; Pettersson, 
2011; Mulinari et al., 2015; Rall, 2006; Sundberg, 
2010; Voskuhl, 2004) present computer-aided 
scientific projects as comprising distinct exper-
tises: the practical hands-on skills of program-
mers and the conceptual/theoretical knowledge 
of the scientist, combined through collaboration. 
Taking a selection of such studies as exemplars, 
this theme is apparent in Agar’s claim that histori-
cally, “one difference that [the introduction of ] 
computers made to science was deepening the 
division of labour – and expanding one side of the 
division, professional computing services” (Agar, 
2006: 900). Similarly, Hine argues that:
This division of labour [between science/
knowledge and computing/programming] is 
conventional in [the] development of information 
systems. The database developer is responsible for 
identifying ‘user requirements’, and is expected to 
get to know users and find out what their needs 
are. (Hine, 2006: 281). 
On the ‘shop floor’, scientific projects and the 
problem-solving work they involve are depicted 
as presenting the cultural challenge of combining 
skills and expertise by managing group work to 
integrate members’ different capabilities. This is 
exemplified by the following quotations:
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3This particular problem had nothing to do with 
acoustics or digital-signal processing. Rather, it 
was a problem that required those mystical skills 
which enable ‘computer wizards’ to rescue and 
manipulate their machines from the most hopeless 
situations...My informants would refer to those 
who were capable of successfully manipulating 
computers as being ‘wizards’ who always knew a 
‘trick’, an obscure command, or another solution to 
a problem. (Voskuhl, 2004: 405)
Feynman2 is everywhere in this story...Against 
the odds, as the problems increased in size and 
complexity, his team continued to improve [in their 
ability to provide the calculative power necessary 
for the project]. (Rall, 2006: 955)
What these two accounts (and those of Agar, 2006; 
Bruun and Sierla, 2008; and Hine, 2006) convey is a 
sense of scientific knowledge as achieved through 
integrating disparate skills and understandings 
into a socially-constructed unified (though dis-
tributed) solution. However, where Voskuhl (2004) 
refers to the mystical skills of ‘computer wizards’ 
as tricks of programming, our interest falls upon 
what such ‘tricks’ practically consist of, and how 
they might constitute the practical work of doing 
acoustics and/or digital-signal processing with 
computers. Similarly, if Feynman is everywhere 
in Rall’s (2006) story it is because Rall is narrat-
ing Feynman’s endeavours as a team manager, 
whereas we would be interested in the story Rall 
doesn’t tell of Feynman’s role as a physicist.3
Some researchers seeking to investigate 
the organisation of scientific knowledge as a 
topic completely separable from the content of 
scientific knowledge; e.g. in Sundberg’s (2010: 
39) analysis of ‘simulation code collectives’ – 
groups whose collective and cultural properties 
implicate “the definition and control of simula-
tion code use and development”, whilst others 
extend STS’ remit to include a singular concern 
with the cultural aspects of research. Pettersson 
(2011: 47) for instance aims explicitly “to analyse 
experimental practices among plasma physicists 
as gender creating processes with perspectives 
from masculinity studies”, Götschel (2011) studies 
how physics has been used to reinforce misogyny, 
Louvel (2012) investigates the industrialisation 
of doctoral scientific work as representative of 
a grand shift in what constitutes scientific work, 
and Mulinari et al. (2015: 55) critique the “uneven, 
partial and sometimes even contradictory” neolib-
eral social and political factors surrounding stem 
cell research. 
We do not dispute the findings of these 
studies – rather, we suggest that their accounts 
of ‘knowledge production’ in scientific research 
are partial, inasmuch as they do not capture 
the practical activities through which scien-
tists produce knowledge in their labs (or at their 
computers). Thus the aforementioned researchers 
preclude a demonstration of the ways in which 
the social and cultural factors that form their 
topic enter into the day-to-day doings of scien-
tific research as knowledge production. Their 
focus comes at the expense of acknowledging 
the material practices of doing scientific work, and 
how those practices execute scientific tasks – for 
example, the hands-on nature of experimenta-
tion in neurobiology (Lynch, 1985), or the aspects 
of embodiment involved in understanding how a 
Mars Rover moves and sees (Vertesi, 2012, 2015), 
or in the case of the present paper, leveraging 
computer programming skills to explore gravita-
tional lensing as an astrophysical phenomenon. 
We aim to reinforce a focus on the ‘content’ of 
scientific knowledge (and the scientific business 
of making analysable records of it), by shifting 
focus from surrounding social and cultural factors 
and towards the practical activities comprising the 
execution of the work. Though we acknowledge 
the wider social context in which one astrophysics 
researcher’s work is embedded (and account for 
this in  detail below), the purpose of this paper 
is to concentrate more intently on the ‘indepen-
dently executed’ aspects of scientific work as the 
underexplored counterpart to the great wealth of 
studies which focus more on the directly collabo-
rative and/or interactional activities of scientists.
Methods
Our choice to focus on the material aspects of 
scientific programming is partly methodological 
– as a hitherto underdeveloped site of research, 
it is worth exploring what sorts of activity scien-
tific programming might comprise even if only to 
elucidate on how such things might be captured 
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4for future social research. The neglect of the mate-
rial practices of computational scientific work has 
been attributed by Bruun and Sierla (2008) to the 
difficulties in locating and capturing such activi-
ties. As they note:
Recordings of real-time actions and interactions of 
the project members would have contributed to 
an in-depth understanding of the circumstances 
through which knowledge networking 
solutions were produced. This could have been 
accomplished through video-recording, but many 
of the interactions, decisions and deliberations 
in research projects were difficult to capture in 
real time, even with a video camera, because they 
were not fixed in time and space…What is more, 
in software development much of the crucial 
interaction occurs when engineers browse, study, 
modify and integrate artefacts that have been 
developed by colleagues. These activities dominate 
the experience of most software engineers and 
constrain many of their decisions, but there is little 
overt, bodily behaviour to be observed: only mouse 
and keyboard use. (Bruun and Sierla, 2008: 140)
Bruun and Sierla (2008) have two complaints: 
firstly, that people won’t stand still long enough 
for their interactions to be videoed, and sec-
ondly, that what does take place in a static setting 
– mouse and keyboard use – is not of any inter-
est. However, they thereby overlook the sense in 
which the operational work of mouse and key-
board usage is embedded within scientific knowl-
edge. It is precisely this arena involving little overt 
bodily behaviour in which much of the work of 
programming-for-a-scientific-project takes place, 
and it is the goings on within this arena that forms 
the focus of the research presented here.
It is not our claim that screen-work – work 
performed and achieved using the visual 
resources available within a computer screen – 
is an asocial endeavor. Indeed, screen-work is 
sometimes a thoroughly collaborative affair, as in 
the case of traders in the foreign exchange market 
dependent on information appearing on-screen 
in Knorr Cetina’s (2003) examination of the role of 
‘scopic media’ in their work, or in Vertesi’s (2012, 
2015) work on the role of images and image 
construction across the different disciplinary 
teams collaborating on the Mars Exploration 
Rover project. However, in the cases analysed here, 
screen-work is done without much (if any) face-
to-face or even remote (i.e. online) collaboration. 
That much scientific activity is collaborative does 
not exclude the fact that it can also be performed 
via solitary effort. We agree with Carusi’s (2011: 
332) claim that there is more to visualisation 
work than face-to-face interaction, and that “the 
sociality of visual practices – the fact of their 
being shared by communities – is not sufficient to 
account for what is seen through those practices”.4 
This is evidenced in Vertesi’s (2015) work which 
attends to the ways in which images pertinent to 
the Mars Exploration Rover project move between 
two types of setting: the collaborative team-based 
planning meetings and conference calls, and 
the desks and screens of individuals scientists. 
Vertesi’s ethnography demonstrates that though 
the work of image construction is inevitably 
achieved through individual effort – mouse and 
keyboard usage (cf. Bruun and Sierla, 2008) – their 
efforts are designed and conducted precisely so 
that they feed into, and even display, the broader 
social and cultural context work of the Mars Explo-
ration Rover project. Failing to acknowledge the 
movement of images between the two settings 
would entirely misrepresent what it is those indi-
viduals are doing, and their reasons for doing 
those things in the way they do. Just so with the 
astrophysics researcher whose work forms our 
subject – we explore the specific ways in which 
this occurs for our case-at-hand below.
For present purposes however, it is worth 
noting in a general sense that the social elements 
of the tasks of screen-work, at least for the astro-
physics researcher whose work forms our subject, 
are visible in the work only in an asynchronous 
fashion. This is something captured by Button and 
Sharrock (1996) who characterise the annotating 
work of programmers, as holding a utility not for 
their current task but for future users and devel-
opers of their program. In an even more funda-
mental sense, the work of programming rests on 
the performance of other forms of interactivity 
which consist of irrevocably social elements – 
no more can there be a private programming 
language than there can be a private linguistic 
one (cf. Wittgenstein, 1974)! Yet there remains a 
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5degree to which certain episodes of project work 
are isolated from the communal scientific action 
that typically forms the subjects of sociological 
interest, as Vertesi (2012) notices of the embodied 
scientific work of remotely controlling the Mars 
Rover:
During my fieldwork, I certainly witnessed 
situations in which such semiotic acts [embodied 
movements representing the physical hardware of 
the Mars Rover] were communicative in nature, in 
which a wheelie chair maneuver or a skilled twist 
of the elbow was a central articulation in the work 
of coordinating action at a distance. However, the 
vast majority of times I witnessed these gestures, 
there was no one else in the room. Most frequently, 
scientists, engineers, and technicians alike gestured 
in what were clearly formal, codified, standardized 
ways of enacting the Rover, but they did so entirely 
alone, speaking to mutually invisible interlocutors 
on a telecon line. (Vertesi, 2012: 402)
Similarly, the astrophysics researcher’s work 
depicted in this paper may be understood as inde-
pendently executed – work achieved in large part 
without guidance or consultation, though none-
theless embedded in a collaborative structure 
reliant on remote and asynchronous connection 
through infrastructure rather than face-to-face 
interactions. 
In saying that the work is ‘independently 
executed’ we have the following in mind: (1) in 
relation to the gradual acquisition of professional 
competence, postgraduate researchers (such as 
HR, whose work we report) can be making the 
transition toward being able to work indepen-
dently of close supervision and evaluation in 
carrying out a research task on their own behalf, 
(2) in relation to the task, whose execution does 
not depend on interaction with and contributions 
from others but can be carried out in (relative) 
solitude and (3) in relation to the division of labour 
within the project where the task at hand is self-
contained and does not require connections to 
the several other comparable graduate projects 
that are contributing to the wider goals of the 
research group.
Video-aided ethnography
Methodologically, this presents a problem for a 
social study of science – what is to be found in a 
setting where nothing explicitly social seems to 
have happened? And what might constitute an 
appropriate method of capturing whatever work 
might be involved? We have used an analytic ori-
entation that captures key features of the settings 
as they appear to those involved (i.e. astrophysics 
programmers). Our understandings of the setting 
rely on knowledge gained through fieldwork5 as 
well as repeated viewings of the video. Drawing 
on ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) and asso-
ciated video analysis techniques (Goodwin, 1994, 
2001), our approach attempts to understand how 
the organization of the work at hand is displayed 
– made accountable – within the resources avail-
able on the computer screen where the work is 
sited. This is patent to the practitioner doing the 
work, it being his routine activity, but needs to 
be accommodated in sociological descriptions of 
that work. The adoption of a video-aided ethno-
graphic method is designed to elicit access to the 
resources with which scientific researchers using 
computer technologies can achieve their work 
independently, and to examine what sociologists 
can draw from this seemingly arid environment.
This paper examines work from a larger project 
investigating the use of computerised tech-
nologies (typically, programming languages) in 
different sciences which combine research with 
training. The focus is on early-stage researchers 
doing project work toward the attainment of 
a postgraduate qualification. The focus on this 
stage in a research career facilitates the obser-
vation and understanding of the settings in 
question as exploratory endeavours in both 
scientific knowledge and method, both of which 
are actively topicalised by participants as part of 
their work. Furthermore, through that topicalising, 
both of those things are made available to social 
research, i.e. made ‘accountable’ for both partici-
pants and observers (Garfinkel, 1967).
Our approach to video collection and analysis 
draws from existing ethnomethodologically-
informed studies (e.g. Alač, 2011;Sormani et al., 
2017; Bezemer et al., 2011; Goodwin, 1994, 2001; 
Lindwall, 2008), and equips our video analytic 
work with a strongly contextualised under-
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6standing of the setting. Preparation was under-
taken by the principal author to furnish the video 
analysis with the level of scientific competence 
necessary to understand the finer details of the 
activities at hand (see footnote five). It is difficult 
to quantify the time spent on preparation – 
preparatory work has continued throughout 
the analysis and presentation of the research, 
each iteration prompting more ‘preparation’ to 
understand previously unnoticed features of the 
video. Recording the video took much less time – 
approximately twenty hours over several days.
Results
Context of the Study
We examine one astrophysics researcher’s activi-
ties over one working day, as he attends to a 
problem in developing a program for automati-
cally identifying instances of the astronomi-
cal phenomenon of gravitational lensing. The 
researcher in question (HR) was a postgraduate 
student, with an undergraduate degree in physics 
incorporating the learning of programming lan-
guages in addition to classes in more conceptual 
topics (i.e. fluid dynamics, quantum mechanics, 
stellar evolution, etc). HR was working on his dis-
sertation within a research group consisting of 15 
other postgraduates, all under supervision by a 
professor of astronomy. The projects undertaken 
by each ‘team’ member were topically diverse 
and coordinated by their shared supervisor (who 
had developed each of their projects to feed into 
his ongoing research interests and projects). The 
projects underway at this time were typically 
designed to address technical and/or procedural 
research questions – the relative ‘mundanities’ 
of astronomical research which may not promise 
discoveries in the sense of finding and explaining 
new phenomena or objects, but which address 
the requirements for doing discovery work.
Returning to the ways in which HR’s ‘inde-
pendently executed’ work is conducted within 
a broader scientific context, we note that this is 
evidenced most clearly in two ways. First, that HR’s 
position as a postgraduate researcher, working 
under a supervisor who manages a thematically-
organised team of postgraduate researchers, 
places him as a cog in a grander machine. In this 
sense, HR’s work is inherently integrated with 
other researchers working under his supervisor, 
as well as with the supervisor and their colleagues 
(who are vested in the success of postgraduate 
projects to feed into their own research). Second, 
and related, the code and images HR works with 
are designed to be used and viewed by others. His 
work (described below) is to produce a technique 
which can be replicated and applied in other 
scientific contexts and by other scientists. Hence, 
the value of HR’s code and visualisations is, and 
can only possibly be, evaluated on the basis of 
their contribution to other scientific efforts. Taken 
in this way, the problems that HR encounters in 
his work (some of which we outline below) not 
only obstruct the successful completion of a post-
graduate dissertation, but present difficulties in 
terms of the capacity for the work to be used by 
others in the scientific community. However, it 
is worth reiterating that for both these reasons, 
constant face-to-face coordination is not essential 
to the undertaking of HR’s project, even despite 
its inherent connectedness with other scientists’ 
work. HR’s scientific activities are social, without 
co-present collaborators at the time of their 
undertaking.
Turning now to the specifics of HR’s project, 
we note that his project was to investigate the 
potential for an automated computational 
method of gravitational lens detection to displace 
the non-automated/time-consuming practice 
of identifying lenses solely ‘by eye’. HR’s work 
was designed to be achievable through his inde-
pendent research activities – having been given 
the project brief and some initial suggestions 
as ‘jumping-off points’, HR was expected (by his 
supervisor and by the design of his project as a 
postgraduate dissertation) to develop and deploy 
the necessary skills to complete the work individ-
ually and without need for supervisory guidance. 
It was HR’s sole responsibility to learn how to see 
and read features of his visualisations, grounded 
in his existing programming and astrophysics 
learning. Despite HR’s project involving writing a 
bespoke program, this work was conducted using 
widely available and ‘off-the-shelf ’ tools which 
are simultaneously task-specific and all-purpose, 
consisting of a freely-available dataset (see 
below), a standard laptop computer, a program-
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7ming language (Python), several freely-available 
Python libraries providing functionality relevant 
to handling numbers and images within Python, 
and a text editor interface within which the 
programming language could be developed.
HR’s method to identify gravitational lenses 
was to find, by looking at the images on the 
screen, two peaks of radiation emission relating 
to each stellar object in each of the images of 
his 2148-strong dataset – his data consisted of 
537 possible lensing events, each of which had 
4 images describing a different EM (electromag-
netic) radiation profile. This information was used 
to ascertain if there was a visible (to HR) distor-
tion of the radiation emitted by each object 
and from that decide if the image represents a 
gravitational lens.6 HR’s data was drawn from the 
Sloan Digital Sky Survey (2013), a large database 
of images available to scientists and the general 
public. The SDSS is a long-running data collection 
enterprise using a dedicated telescope at Apache 
Point Observatory (New Mexico, USA) to collect 
astronomical images for a variety of purposes. HR 
had acquired, via his supervisor, a curated subset 
of an SDSS dataset, containing candidate images 
of gravitational lenses, and it is these which HR 
is attempting to classify so as to develop an 
automated classification procedure.
The video shows HR working on a basic 
program he had already written which, so far, clas-
sified with a maximum 80% accuracy (this being 
determined by the computer’s inability to produce 
any kind of result for around 20% of the images). 
To improve (and more systematically measure) 
the program’s accuracy, HR worked on developing 
a manual input system which would provide his 
algorithmic technique with information about 
the coordinates of the two radiation peaks on an 
image, to develop his program’s capacity to locate 
radiation peaks on the images it processed. The 
reasoning it thus: while some images may contain 
anomalies which confuse the computer’s ability 
to decide, if the program is told which of the two 
peaks are relevant (and ignore all others) then it 
should yield better decisions about whether an 
image represents a lenses.
Having decided how to improve his image-
classification program, HR wrote a script to allow 
a viewing of each of the 2148 images in turn and 
entry of the coordinates locating the peaks in 
the image. The usage of this script – effectively 
a front-end for contributing new metadata to 
each image by cycling through the corpus and 
appending the location by two mouse clicks – is 
captured on video. The process can be boiled 
down to the following (ideal) steps: he inspects 
the image to see if the position of the peaks is 
obvious (as is the case in Figure 1, in which there 
are two clear peaks with a clear lensing interaction 
between them). For more ambiguous cases, HR 
can use other images of the same galactic system 
in other wavelengths to cross-check against the 
image being worked on (see Figure 2 – also note 
the sub-display which magnifies the section 
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Figure 1. A ‘good’ lens with a clear lensing interaction (highlighted).
8around the cursor). Having identified the peaks ‘by 
eye’, HR can record the location of the first peak 
by clicking on it with the left mouse button, the 
second peak with the right mouse button, then 
keystroke [n] to move on to the next image and 
repeat the process. Various elements of ‘looking 
for’ and ‘finding’ activities bear on HR’s work. 
Making code visual
Code is scripted text providing a list of operations 
(and the instruction to run them) collated under 
the larger structure of a program, and is writ-
ten in a dedicated programming language (i.e. a 
software package for mathematical and compu-
tational processing) which a computer can imple-
ment. However, it is vital that not only computers 
but programmers can read and understand code, 
and as Davis and Hersh (1981) note of the work of 
mathematics (which has a direct relationship to 
the work of programming in a multitude of ways):
The layman might get the idea that a skilful 
mathematician can sight-read a page of 
mathematics in the way that Liszt sight-read a page 
of difficult piano music. This is rarely the case. The 
absorption of a page of mathematics on the part 
of the professional is often a slow, tedious, and 
painstaking process. (Davis and Hersh, 1981: 281)
Familiarity and skill with a programming language 
is often essential to absorbing the vast amounts of 
code making up complex programs, but as Button 
and Sharrock (1995) note, the visual organisation 
of the code is crucial to making explicit the spe-
cific reasons as to why it might be structured in 
one way and not another. One method by which 
programmers enable understandings of their 
code is through comments. Comments never 
form a functioning part of the program; their pres-
ence does not affect the program. However, their 
use is common, and not only for documentation 
to guide future users. 
According to Button and Sharrock (1996), some 
programmers see documentation as an annoyance 
that is irrelevant to the ‘real’ task of getting a 
program to work. In contrast, HR’s comments are 
for his own use in navigating his program, high-
lighting their dual functions of organizing and 
pathfinding. Though the program is inherently 
structured for the purposes of machine reada-
bility – code always executes from line 1 down the 
page (though this may also incorporate functions 
and loops instructing the program to return to a 
previous line) – the programmer has to organise 
and notate this structure for human readability. As 
Spencer notes:
Scientific software is an intricate labyrinth, 
one whose construction and navigation are 
accomplished by one and the same movement. 
(Spencer, 2012: 99)
To elucidate this aspect of programming, we 
examine HR’s division of his code into separate 
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Figure 2. Cross-checking in another wavelength.
9sections (to mark points where one coding task 
becomes another) by making a border of blue7 
commented hash marks at the start and end of 
each section. Practically, this means that HR can 
easily search for specific sections of the program, 
relying on visual cues. HR also uses comments to 
label distinct coding tasks – visual tags that make 
the subsequent code more understandable. For 
instance, HR has a line appearing as follows:
#BEGINNING OF PARSELTONGUE8 SCRIPT
This comment marks out the following code as 
other than typical Python language – since Parsel-
Tongue is different to Python it is useful for HR to 
remind himself to read the following code as  per-
taining to ParselTongue specifically (as opposed 
to Python generally); this provides clarity when 
it comes to reading, debugging and other tasks. 
However, comments are not just labels for code. 
Comments can also situate code as part of a pro-
cess. For instance, HR has the following comment 
in his code:
#now mask out a few pixels around this 
peak position, to detect the second 
peak
As Button and Sharrock (1995) note, the visual 
organisation of a program accounts for (i.e. makes 
visibly apparent) its own computational organi-
sation, and comments such as this help HR to 
navigate through the master code screen by giv-
ing some indication of where in the code HR is if 
this is the section he’s looking at. The comment 
above, by implication, relates to a section of code 
that must be after the section that deals with find-
ing the first peak on an image. As such, if HR was 
to search for the specific code dealing with find-
ing the first peak, the comment is a resource for 
ascertaining whether to look before or after (and 
also, how far before or after) the section of code 
currently on screen. HR enforces what Brown and 
Laurier (2005: 252) refer to in mobile-based car-
tography as a ‘structure of places’, which simulta-
neously locates the boundaries of entities within 
the structure (be they geographic areas or coding 
tasks) and renders the structure navigable. HR’s 
practical work with comments also displays the 
utility of comments as navigational devices; sign-
posts that point programmers in the right direc-
tion, helping them find the code they’re searching 
for against otherwise visually undifferentiated 
lines of code.
Highlighting for visibility
HR’s work also involves the integration of infor-
mation from different sources (i.e. his database of 
manually inputted peak coordinates, image files, 
the master code screen, etc). HR practically transi-
tions between windows by creating a temporary 
visibility arrangement through highlighting his 
current location in one window. In editing, HR 
added to a variable in the master code to inte-
grate his new peak coordinates database into it. 
Effectively, he tells the computer not to look at the 
raw images, but to use his new coordinates data-
bases to direct where it focuses with regard to the 
two peaks. This editing involves making two cop-
ies of the (linked) variables below:
a = DATA_DIR+‘all_sources’
afile = np.loadtxt(a, dtype=str)
This copying of variables reflects a known feature 
of programming – there is ‘a propensity towards 
re-use and economy in finding solutions rather 
than working out a solution from scratch’ (Martin 
and Rooksby, 2006: 8). HR edits the copied ver-
sions of this variable by changing  variable names 
and associated data (from ‘a’ to ‘b’ and ‘a’ to ‘c’, 
from ‘afile’ to ‘bfile’ and ‘afile’ to ‘cfile’ etc). Most 
crucially, the ‘all_sources’ script needs changing 
to reflect the filenames that HR wants the new 
variables to pull his manual input data from. To 
do this, HR must check the filenames of these 
databases, navigating temporarily away from the 
master code window to the database itself (which 
features the filename in its title bar). Prior to mov-
ing windows, HR highlights the ‘all_sources’ script 
in the new variable ‘b’, to make it stand out against 
the background of other code on-screen. HR then 
goes to the database to retrieve the filename 
and upon his return to the master code window, 
is able to use the highlight to reorient himself 
quickly and easily to the section of code that this 
filename should replace – the ‘all_sources’ script 
in variable ‘b’ is changed to ‘imageposition1’, and 
variable ‘c’ is changed to ‘imageposition2’ accord-
Brooker et al.
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ingly (see Figure 3 below for HR doing the high-
lighting work, and a representation of the section 
of code after editing). 
Here, highlighting is a quick, easy and 
temporary marker, which can serve as a place-
holder as the code is developed (Button and 
Sharrock, 1995). HR’s highlighting work is thus an 
example of a ‘micro-practice’ of screen- or scopic-
work (cf. Alač, 2011; Knorr Cetina, 2003; Lynch 
and Edgerton, 1988) which is non-intrusive to the 
development of the program (in that it does not 
change the machine instructions) but can provide 
a visual emphasis on the script-to-be-changed to 
make it more ‘findable’ and thereby easily editable.
How to find through searching
Clearly, recoverability is a key issue for HR – he has 
to be able to find specific images, various data-
bases (and particular information within them), 
filenames, sections of code, etc. Often, the loca-
tion of the thing HR is searching for is not defined 
exactly and the best possible direction can only 
be phrased as ‘somewhere within this database’ 
or ‘somewhere in this set of images’. Various prac-
tices of ‘looking for’ items such as these come up 
in HR’s work, and these practices use resources 
available through HR’s design of his working prac-
tices. As Martin and Rooksby (2006: 8) note of cod-
ing, “knowledge of the code base is knowledge 
of your way round it, how things might be con-
nected and what the implications of changing a 
piece of code may be”. This applies to HR’s visuali-
sation work in a variety of ways. For some sought 
after items, finding them can be simply entering 
a filename into a form, e.g., HR is searching for an 
image file in his database of peak coordinates, 
and, being able to refer to original image filename 
as it is on screen, he can copy this information into 
the ‘find’ form, keystroke [Enter], and the com-
puter skips through the database directly to the 
desired filename (see Figure 4 below). 
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Figure 3. Highlighting ‘all sources’, plus the finished edit of the section of code under development.
Figure 4. A ‘find’ menu.
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In other cases  a simple ‘call-and-response’ solu-
tion is unavailable – as Suchman (1994: 185) notes, 
“The problem is not simply that communicative 
troubles arise that do not arise in human com-
munication, but rather that when the inevitable 
troubles do arise, there are not the same resources 
available for their detection and repair”. In these 
cases, HR relies on other (visual) resources, e.g. HR 
makes a mistake in clicking on an image (image 
1) and only realises this after moving to the next 
image (image 2) (see Figure 5 below). HR then 
needs to go back, re-examine image 1, delete the 
information mistakenly entered, then re-process 
the image). He does this by temporarily stepping 
out of the confines of the manual input/image 
processing work to recall it. 
Working outside the program, HR has to call 
up images using the master code window. He has 
to start the manual input program again, but can 
choose at which point in the sequence of images 
to start: if the value of the variable ‘i’ is changed 
to 309 (as in the video), then the program calls 
the three hundred and ninth image in that set. HR 
chooses a value of ‘i’ that he thinks relates image 
1 (i = 309), only to find that the image this value 
brings up is not the one he wants. He has to use 
other resources to ascertain the value of ‘i’ for the 
image he does want; having seen the unwanted 
image now on screen he can use its visual features 
to work out its likely position relative to image 1 
(i = 309). The image on-screen at this point was 
the one after the image he needs to redo – he can 
Brooker et al.
Figure 5. Storyboard of events.
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see image 2, but he wants to be able to see image 
1 – and as such, HR can infer that the value of ‘i’ 
he actually requires to continue with his work is 
one fewer than 309 (i = 308). Here, HR has to draw 
on visual properties of the images on-screen (i.e. 
does it look like the one he wants? If not, can 
he recognise it? If so, can he pinpoint where in 
the sequence this unwanted image is and infer 
the relative position of the wanted image?) to 
tie specific images to their specific points in the 
process. As Goodwin (2001: 179) notes, “visual 
phenomena become meaningful through the 
way in which they help elaborate, and are elabo-
rated by, a range of other semiotic fields” such 
as sequential organization, and by relying on 
various identifiable visual properties of the things 
he is searching for, HR is able to draw on a set of 
resources that makes his working with visualisa-
tions achievable. 
Finding visual utility in images
HR’s program is meant to distinguish between 
gravitational lensing systems and other non-lens 
objects, given an input of images of those objects 
in one or more wavelengths. At this point in HR’s 
work the program is in the process of being devel-
oped; its capacity to do this consistently is there-
fore in question. As Lynch notes of his own work 
on biology lab science, ‘artifacts’ – “moments in 
the work, where the ordinary transitivity of prac-
tices was a confounding issue” (Lynch, 1985: 84) – 
“were not collected and analyzed in lab research, 
but ‘fell out’ as occasioned troubles in ‘visibility’ 
or ‘interpretation’” (Lynch, 1985: 89). However, for 
HR, the possibility of artifacts is more expected 
given the uncertainty around the program’s abil-
ity to perform classifications. HR is mindful of such 
artifacts appearing in his results as questions-
that-have-yet-to-be-addressed – are the images 
the program identifies as lenses actually lenses? 
Are the other objects it identifies as non-lenses 
actually non-lenses? Are the images for which the 
computer produces a ‘je’ error9 actually ambigu-
ous? All of these questions are answerable only 
upon the production of results, and to determine 
whether or not the results the program produces 
are (likely to be) accurate, HR has first to classify 
the images himself.
The work HR puts in to classifying the set of 
images manually allows him to match results to 
images and make an informed decision about 
how well the program is performing, which is 
something the program cannot yet do. In one 
instance, HR comes across a ‘nice’ image (see 
Figure 6) during manual input which he picks out 
because of an interesting feature that is clearly 
visible on it – a galactic arm.10 This feature is 
interesting to HR for a number of reasons, chief 
amongst which are that it is rare to see something 
so well defined among these images, which 
makes it of general interest astronomically. Hence, 
HR sets this image aside – he selects (Lynch, 1988) 
and values (Vertesi, 2012) it at least in part for its 
aesthetic qualities as a clear representation of 
a galactic object. However, the presence of this 
feature is also relevant to the current program-
ming, in that it stands as a strong indicator that the 
image is a gravitational lens (because at least one 
of the primary objects is very likely to be a galaxy, 
which is the case for a good deal of positively 
identified lensing systems), and would therefore 
be useful as a test case for checking against the 
result the program produces. It is the finding of 
a distinguishing feature in a specific image that 
provides its utility. As HR explains:
This looks kinda cool, I think this is a gravitational 
lens and is a-, this one looks very close to the...to 
the...so you- you tend only to have one bright lens: 
another one and this [the secondary object] one 
looks close to the galaxy cos you can see some sort 
of galactic arm. So, that might be nice to see what’s 
gonna happen.
For HR, images like this, where there are criteria 
for judging this a ‘strong’ lens or non-lens, are 
useful in getting the program to work. Goodwin 
(2001: 163) notes that it is particularly important 
to attend to “the contextually based practices of 
the participants who are assembling and using 
[…] images to accomplish the work that defines 
their profession”. With this in mind, being able 
to spot these ‘strong’ images as they come up 
becomes a key element of HR’s programming 
work. He can capitalise on his ability to make 
scientifically-informed visual classifications of sin-
gle images, which when combined with the pro-
gram’s capacity to process lots of images quickly 
Science & Technology Studies XX(X)
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(and with quantified statistical information that 
indicates how accurate it judges its results to be) 
provide adequate resources for refining the pro-
gram. Lynch and Edgerton (1988) mark a quantita-
tive/qualitative distinction in the scientific use of 
images in astronomy, citing examples of astrono-
mers noting that images do not enable quantita-
tive tasks, but allow for broader and more intuitive 
viewings of the data by eye. Lynch and Edgerton’s 
(1988) approach, with which we would agree, is 
not to argue that these qualitative viewings are 
‘unscientific’ in any way, but to recast the work of 
producing quantitative (scientific) results as some-
thing that can legitimately be achieved by a work 
process featuring qualitative (subjective, creative) 
elements.11 As HR looks at the image of a galaxy 
with a visible galactic arm, he is able to spot at a 
glance what his program has (as yet) no ability to 
‘see’. This asymmetry between HR’s and the pro-
grams’ capabilities provides a tool for progressing 
towards a positive outcome.  
Arranging for comparison
For HR, this day’s work is to improve the program’s 
ability to discriminate lenses from non-lenses (i.e. 
to reduce the number of ‘je’ errors in the results, 
currently in around 20% of cases). HR therefore 
needs to ask if this day’s work is contributing to 
this objective, and finding a way of checking this 
becomes an issue. In one instance, HR compares 
the results produced by two different versions 
of the program: version 1 (the original program, 
which takes basic data from all images) and ver-
sion 2 (the ‘new’ program, which integrates infor-
Brooker et al.
mation about the peak coordinates defined by HR 
through manual input). This is intended to reveal 
what is happening in the new version, and both 
versions of results are fundamentally compara-
ble – there are entries for each individual image 
in both versions. This is similarity to the reading 
work mammographers apply to their images, as 
characterised by Slack et al.:
Mammograms are arranged to be viewed in a 
manner that renders the biography of a particular 
breast visible. Mammograms from previous 
screenings are juxtaposed with those from 
the current round. Practically, this enables the 
radiologist to assess if any changes have taken 
place and to examine features in a retrospective-
prospective manner (Slack et al., 2007: 178)
Furthermore, Amann and Knorr Cetina note that, 
“Analyzability is not just imposed upon the visual 
record by labelling and other techniques. Rather, 
it is built into the record from the beginning 
through the way the experiment is designed”’ 
(Amann and Knorr Cetina, 1990: 107), and in ways 
that rely on the visual arrangement of on-screen 
information in the name of facilitating the work to 
be done with them (Knorr Cetina, 2003). Compara-
bly, HR has pre-designed the day’s task such that 
he can produce, arrange and correlate two tables 
of results (from version 1 and version 2) for single 
images and use any differences in results to judge 
whether the new program is better or worse in 
terms of its ability to discriminate lenses from 
non-lenses.
Figure 6. A ‘nice’ image featuring a galaxy with visible arm (highlighted).
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To amplify this comparability and make it more 
visually manifest, HR arranges the two results 
screens side-by-side, such that the results for indi-
vidual images are broadly on a level (see Figure 7). 
With this configuration of the two versions’ results, 
HR makes an at-a-glance comparison of the first 
few cases – so far, the results seem improved in 
that there appear to be fewer ‘je’ errors in version 
2 than in version 1. However, looking more closely, 
HR begins to compare individual cases from both 
versions’ results, accenting these cases by clicking 
on cells within the row (thereby drawing attention 
to individual lines on each display to enable an 
easy shifting of gaze between them). Thus, HR 
highlights the cells in case three in version 1, then 
the cells in case three in version 2, allowing him 
to see that for this case, version 2 produces a ‘je’ 
error whereas version 1 produces a valid result. 
It is this fact that prompts HR to pick out case 
three specifically – for case three, the suppos-
edly ‘improved’ program (version 2) can no longer 
classify an image that was classifiable in version 
1. The program’s capability to make a decision 
should have been improved across the board; that 
it has worsened in some cases is a possible cause 
for concern. HR goes through more case-by-case 
comparisons for cases in version 2 resulting in a 
‘je’ error, and finds that this is not a one-off, but 
recurs. HR eventually attends to case nineteen (see 
the magnified section of Figure 7) and explains:
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[The program] gives me one [a ‘je’ error] here- oof! 
Thissa bad one. This is bad... I’ll just have to go 
through the data to...it seems that it’s not as ideal 
as I thought.
Because case nineteen has a particularly strong 
numerical result in version 1, the presence of a ‘je’ 
error in version 2 has a stronger resonance for HR’s 
work, instigating a diagnostic approach to ascer-
tain why this is so (see Visual Diagnostics below). 
As Lynch notes of his biology lab researchers, 
when their experiments failed to work, a question 
remained: “’Did we do it correctly? Is there any-
thing we could have done that would have made 
it work?’ Such questions arise in the absence of 
a possible authoritative resolution by means of 
comparisons to a standard” (Lynch, 1985: 114). HR 
however does have a standard (of sorts) since he 
understands how the two versions differ and so is 
able to use an earlier version of results as a ‘sub-
standard’ (the comparative criterion being that 
the old results should be worse than the new). 
From looking at how this comparison is made, it 
is clear that there is a marked difference between 
what HR can see at first glance (i.e. that version 2 is 
in fact an improvement) and what can be seen on 
closer inspection (i.e. that that improvement has 
some concerning caveats which must be further 
investigated). Through visually arranging the two 
sets of results for comparison HR allows himself 
Figure 7. Comparing results side-by-side, with case nineteen highlighted in each set.
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both a broad at-a-glance comparison between 
them, and sets the stage for a more detailed case-
by-case comparison which counts towards a posi-
tive development of the project.12
Visual diagnostics
As with any other endeavour, working with visu-
alisations often heralds problems, and diagnostic 
work must be performed to search for, locate and 
solve them. Complex problems might even ‘hide’ 
errors from view, and programmers might have to 
rely on a variety of diagnostic techniques to come 
to a solution. These are, in the ethnomethodo-
logical parlance, the ‘normal troubles’ of program-
ming work. Given his reliance on visualisations, HR 
makes use of visual resources for diagnoses. To 
ascertain why his new version of the program is 
producing ‘je’ errors where there were no errors 
in the original untreated results. HR checks results 
case-by-case, and notices that case nineteen is 
giving a ‘je’ error in version 2 of the program but 
a valid result in version 1. However, the question 
why this should be remains – which version of the 
program has made the correct call – perhaps the 
program is right to call image nineteen a ‘je’ error 
if the object is genuinely ambiguous (i.e. that it is 
difficult to tell whether it is or is not a gravitational 
lens)? Or perhaps, as the weight of evidence of 
unexpected ‘je’ errors in version 2’s results sug-
gests, the program is somehow not using HR’s 
manual input as he would like it to? To resolve his 
problem HR calls up the original image for case 
nineteen (see Figure 8 below) to classify it with his 
own visual judgment. As Knuuttila notes of par-
ticular types of programs used in syntactic analy-
sis called ‘parsers’:
above all, the parser must function well, which 
means that a parser must be able to carry out some 
of the tasks (i.e. syntactic analysis) that humans can. 
To do this, parsers do not necessarily have to be 
‘psychologically realistic,’ and it is highly probably 
that they will not be so. (Knuuttila, 2006: 47)
Here, HR is attempting to ensure that his own 
program functions well by pitting his own abili-
ties against the ‘psychologically unrealistic’ pro-
gram’s. From a quick visual analysis of the image, 
HR can see that the image for case nineteen looks 
to be a clear example of a gravitational lens. HR 
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concludes that version 2 must be mistaken in its 
classifying of image nineteen as ‘unclassifiable’, 
and therefore it is something in the program that 
is at fault and not the image or the lens itself. As 
HR notes at this point:
This is weird; this is a really good lens! It gave me 
an error on something that supposed to be, well, 
perfectly fine. Oh boy. This is not going to be good.
This is a significant problem for HR’s project, 
requiring work to understand why the program 
is not able to classify certain lenses that he can 
easily classify himself. As Lynch notes of his biol-
ogy lab researchers, for them, “the most interest-
ing (and problematic) artifacts were not definite 
‘things,’ but were ‘possibilities’ […] As possibili-
ties they were not, as yet, specific features of any 
microscopic scene, but were tied to readings of 
the scene” (Lynch, 1985: 86). This is exactly how HR 
uses visual clues to diagnose problems – he infers, 
from various visual properties of what can be seen 
on screen, the possibilities of what might be hap-
pening. As it stands, the next obvious possibility 
as to what might be happening is that maybe HR’s 
manual input – his clicking on the two peaks in 
each image – was to blame. 
HR opens the two databases of his peak coor-
dinates (x and y coordinates of where he clicked 
on the primary peak, and x and y coordinates 
of where he clicked on the secondary peak) to 
ascertain exactly where on the image he clicked. 
This can then be compared against the image 
itself – this particular screen features a cursor 
magnification function allowing HR to zoom in on 
the area around his cursor and thus locate both 
peaks more precisely (see Figure 2 above and 
Figure 8 below). Comparing his previous clicks 
on the image against where he would now click, 
having taken more care in identifying the peaks, 
HR finds his original clicking was not accurate 
enough: the coordinates in the database are some 
distance from the coordinates of the peaks as they 
appear under the magnified cursor. Therefore, HR 
concludes that his original manual input will need 
to be re-done if it is to be of any use in terms of 
improving the program. HR’s inaccuracy is compa-
rable with Suchman’s (1994) concept of a ‘garden 
path result’, whereby during the course of his 
manual input work, HR:
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takes an action that is in some way faulted, 
which nonetheless satisfies the requirements 
of the design under a different but compatible 
interpretation [i.e. that two clicks have been made, 
regardless of their accuracy]. As a result, the faulty 
action goes by unnoticed at the point where it 
occurs. At the point where the trouble is discovered 
by the user [or programmer], its source is difficult 
or impossible to reconstruct. (Suchman, 1994: 170)
Here, however, HR is ultimately able to diagnose 
and reconstruct the trouble’s source and find the 
problem and its solution, through looking more 
closely at that which (as he understands it now) he 
had rushed through. As Spencer (2012: 92) notes, 
“visualisation can also draw the scientist beyond 
the fact of error, towards its underlying cause and 
towards the future of its eventual resolution”, and 
it is this feature of visualisations that HR draws 
upon in returning to the pictorial view of the data. 
HR is checking if the program can produce some-
thing he can identify visually, and finds the issue 
is his own precision placement in a visual field; his 
accuracy with the manual input, which limits the 
program’s ability to consistently distinguish gravi-
tational lens.
Discussion
The argument presented here is deeply-rooted in 
major themes within the field of STS dealing with 
the interactivity and collaboration involved in pro-
ducing scientific knowledge, particularly pertain-
ing to the usage of digital data and programming 
languages. This work has been characterised by 
Figure 8. The image for case nineteen – the clear distortion of the radiation emitted by the two objects indicates 
a good lens. Also note HR’s use of the magnification display to closely analyse this distortion.
some as purely a matter of the social and cultural 
organisation of scientific research, where suc-
cess in science is achieved through the effective 
bringing together different knowledges and skills 
through collaborative interaction (Agar, 2006; 
Bruun and Sierla, 2008; Götschel, 2011; Hine, 2006; 
Louvel, 2012; Mulinari et al., 2015; Pettersson, 2011; 
Rall, 2006; Sundberg, 2010; Voskuhl, 2004). The 
present paper extends its scope to settings where 
there is “little overt, bodily behavior” (Bruun and 
Sierla, 2008: 140) other than independently-con-
ducted mouse and keyboard use. Though we do 
not deny the sociability inherent to all scientific 
work, we focus our attention on precisely such 
‘independently executed’ activities, in order to 
round out the discussion beyond the more overt 
social and cultural focus that has historically been 
given primacy in the field of science and technol-
ogy studies. 
With this in mind, our attention falls upon 
the ways in which work is achieved through the 
material and practical usage of screen-based 
resources – the visuals and visualisations that are 
generated and used in routine tasks that inform 
reasoning and inference based on what can be 
seen on-screen. The material aspects of scientific 
research work raise a perennial question for STS 
around a (supposed) contradiction: the experi-
menter’s regress. Ruivenkamp and Rip (2010) 
describe Collins’ (1992) original conception of 
the problem: “The unknown is to be captured in 
an experiment, using instruments adequate to 
the task. However, we do not know whether the 
instrument is adequate until we are sure it gives us 
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correct readings. But since the phenomenon itself 
is unknown yet, there is no way to decide what 
correct readings are” (Ruivenkamp and Rip, 2010: 
4). This paper has aimed indirectly to puncture 
this standard conception by demonstrating, in 
the fine detail of their scopic work, that scientists 
can find ways to measure without opening up a 
regress. Hence, the routine character of these 
practices is (or, rather, should be) a critical topic 
for STS researchers. As Garfinkel et al. (1981:139) 
note, “Situated inquiries are practical actions and 
so they must get done as vulgarly competent 
practices”. It is practices such as these that we 
have gone some way towards unpacking here. 
Invariably, for researchers working with visu-
alisations these practices are bound up in the 
visual resources available, not just within code 
but throughout the visualisations themselves. As 
Burri and Dumit (2008: 302) note, “Visual expertise 
also creates its own form of literacy and speciali-
zation”. Such literacy involves the skill to use visu-
alisations as resources and as sources of resources. 
Throughout the day’s work HR could draw on 
the clues left as part of comments in his code, 
temporary visibility arrangements, the ‘sequenti-
ality’ of images and visible features of the images 
themselves, the ability to distinguish by eye 
between ‘good’ lenses and non-lenses, arrange-
ments to facilitate both general (i.e. between 
tables) and direct (i.e. between individual cases) 
comparisons of results, and comparisons of 
different versions of the program. This particular 
constellation of visual resources is useful to HR 
because achieving a working program is the 
object of his work. HR’s visualisations are not 
simply outputs; they are new resources for doing 
new things. Visuality is both the topic and the 
means to address that topic, meaning HR does not 
have to rely entirely on the results produced by 
the program to inform his work – the results them-
selves can be legitimately questioned. This makes 
the program an interplay between the original 
observed data (the images) and the results, facili-
tating an iterative process that requires a ‘building 
up’ of understanding of what effects manual input 
might have on results, and accordingly, what 
information can be drawn from the results and 
associated diagnostic work about the quality of 
the manual input. There is no decisive criterion of 
which iteration might be the last, yet this never-
theless allows for the development of a program 
that will eventually be able to discriminate lenses 
from non-lenses with so few ‘je’ errors as to make 
the whole collection of results statistically useful.
We have tried to show how the practical tasks 
involved in visualisation-based research and 
programming iteratively inform each other, and 
more widely, how work of this kind is conducted 
in such a way as to contribute to the successful 
progress of a scientific project which is reflective 
of scientific research in a computational age. It is 
worthy of note that HR is not any kind of special 
combination of programmer and scientist, in 
that many recent science graduates now have 
some introduction to and hands-on experience 
with one or more programming languages as an 
essential part of their training. For HR, learning 
how to construe visualisations is a joint product 
of his disciplinary knowledge of astrophysics and 
his programming skill. The instances considered 
simultaneously reflect programming activities for 
scientific purposes, the two inextricably bound 
together in the work. What our analysis of the 
collected video data has shown is that despite the 
work at hand being visible through a computer 
screen and associated keyboard and mouse 
usage, it is possible also to attend to the sense in 
which it makes available a set of material practices 
for achieving scientific knowledge.
We have developed six ‘themes’ in HR’s work 
activities, revealing a selection of work activities 
that are mundane and routine in astrophysics 
programming, but which have been, at times, over-
looked from sociology’s accounts owing to their 
material character. Without denying that scien-
tific work is extensively collaborative and inter-
active and affected by social and cultural factors, 
we do take issue with how such a focus might 
be singularly applied to the effect of neglecting 
other aspects of what is going on. In this regard, 
we have explicated HR’s work as a ‘twinned’13 
problem-space of scientific phenomena and 
software. The software constructs and constrains 
HR’s perception of the data – literally, his ability to 
perceive gravitational lenses in the images– whilst 
the phenomenon constructs and constrains the 
use of the software (in that his programming work 
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Notes
1. Certainly the astrophysics research presented here is computational through and through, yet there 
are elements to other types of astrophysics work which are decidedly ‘manual’ and which may only 
use software rather than develop it – see for instance Hoeppe (2012) on the work of collaboratively 
operating a satellite telescope to collect. In this sense we say only that the specific type of astrophysics 
work depicted here is inherently computational, and explore how this specific type of work is achieved.
2. The Feynman under discussion is noted physicist Richard Feynman. Rall (2006) investigates his work 
as the manager of a computing team building the atomic bomb, which first consisted of a) untrained 
scientists’ wives, then b) computer-trained WACs (Women’s Army Corps) and finally c) soldiers with 
computer training and full knowledge of the project objectives.
3. The two versions of Feynman discussed here – Rall’s (2006) Feynman-as-manager and our Feynman-as-
scientist – are not the same in that they do not do the same things, they do not use the same technical 
languages, they do not talk to the same people, they do not draw on the same fields of knowledge to 
achieve their work, and so on.
4. It may be important to note that although our goal is the same – to see what else there might be to 
visualisation- and visual-work beyond interactive and collaborative face-to-face sociality – our project 
differs from Carusi’s (2011). Where Carusi (2011) aims to explore the problem philosophically, our work 
treats the issue as empirical (cf. a similar debate between Bloor and Lynch in Pickering, 1992).
5. This preparatory work has involved (on the part of the principal author): talking to participants and their 
peers and supervisors about their project work and their role in wider research projects and groups; 
learning elements of undergraduate-level textbook science and mathematical techniques; acquiring 
a working knowledge of the Python programming language, and; attending undergraduate lectures 
across all four years of the University of Manchester’s MPhys degree (including lectures on theoretical 
physics, mathematical requirements for physicists, and various aspects of astrophysics including stellar 
evolution, galaxies and early universe cosmology).
6. A gravitational lens is a phenomenon whereby electromagnetic radiation (ultraviolet rays, radio waves, 
visible light in the optical range, x-rays, etc) is ‘bent’ by the gravity of another high-mass object nearer 
to us in our line of sight. Therefore, a lensing system can be identified by the presence of an intercon-
nected distortion between the radiation that each object emits, and a non-lens can be identified by the 
absence of this feature.
7. Python comments in the editor HR is using are (primarily) signified by the use of a hash symbol and 
appear in blue, further visually distinguishing them against other code.
8. ParselTongue is an interface to simplify complicated data reduction in Python (i.e. turning long strings 
of numerical information into images) with techniques from an add-on Python module (Astronomical 
Image Processing System, or AIPS) (Kettenis et al., 2005).
9. A ‘je’ error in HR’s program was a result that signified that the program was unable to classify the image 
in question as a lens or otherwise – most likely the program has identified significant evidence for both 
instances (i.e. the image is a lens, the image is a non-lens) and can’t thereby reject either.
10. The ‘objects’ in lensing systems are often galaxies. Though there are different types of galaxy, spiral 
galaxies (such as our own Milky Way) are comprised of a central concentrated ‘bulge’ of stars and a flat 
rotating disc of stars, dust and gas. This disc features long thin ‘arms’ of stars, which appear like a spiral 
due to their rotation.
11. This may in fact be a key reason for the continuing human involvement in science despite the sweeping 
advances offered by computing power – where computers are far more capable as number crunchers, 
they are somewhat lacking in the qualitative and creative department, which seems to be just as much 
a requirement for the production of scientific knowledge (Lynch and Edgerton, 1988).
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12. Although these results look bad after close comparison, this is not an unrecoverable disaster for HR – it 
certainly is an upset that means his programmed technique for finding lenses and non-lenses is not 
working yet. However, it also points to a need (and direction) for further development and improve-
ment, without which the project would be incomplete.
13. This is not to limit the problem-space to two factors only. This statement should be considered as part 
of the argument against limiting sociology’s remit to only the interactional features of scientific work.
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